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HIGHWAY TO ARMAGEDDON 
Bernhard G. Bechhoefer* 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WORLD POLITICS: ALTERNATIVES FOR 
THE FUTURE •. By David G. Gompert, Michael Mandelbaum, 
Richard L. Warwin, and John H. Burton. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 1977. Pp. xii, 370. Cloth, ~10.95; paper, $6.95. 
This book is part of a large project undertaken by the Council 
on Foreign Relations "to examine important political and eco-
nomic problems not only individually but in relationship to one 
another. . . . Over the course of the next decade, substantial 
adaptation of institutions and behavior will be needed to respond 
- to the changed circumstances of the 1980s and beyond" {pp. ix-
x). As the authors of Nuclear Weapons and World Politics recog-
nize, the "[c]oncern with nuclear weapons has, understandably, 
been dominated by the question of how to avoid cataclysmic war" 
(p. 1). In their own study, therefore, they seek to avoid two pit-
falls: (i) a "preoccupation with the particulars of force posture 
and arms control issues at the expense of conceiving more basic 
alternatives to present conditions;" and (2) "bold but vague pre-
scriptions for-dramatic change that leave unattended the specific 
policy issues most likely, in fact, to form the next decade's nu-
clear agenda" {p. 5). 
The difficulties inherent in forging a policy that will avoid 
cataclysmic war are enormous. Crafting any clear statement of 
foreign policy entails monumental problems of balancing a ple-
thoric variety of political, economic, and strategic interests. The 
perfectionism of many responsible foreign-affairs officers has fre-
quently begot endless meetings, additional drafts that only gild 
the lily, and programmatic statements that recite, all too often 
without any significance to the public, merely the lowest common 
denominator of conflicting views. And by the late fifties, a special 
language-"disarmamentese"-penetrable only by State Depart-
ment "disarmamenters" such as myself and the small group that 
followed the international conferences closely had begun to 
shroud the field of arms control. Today's far more complex tech-
nical problems necessitate the extensive and excellent glossary 
annexed to the book. 
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To bring order from this chaos, the authors hypothesize four 
distinct "nuclear regimes" as a framework for their discussions: 
1. Continuation of the present nuclear stalemate. 
2. Limitations on nuclear weapons which, one might hope, 
would restrict their role to one of deterring the use of other 
nuclear weapons. 
3. Progress towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. 
4. Strategic deterioration leading to a nuclear imbalance be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States. 
There may be other ways to slice the cake, but I have de-
scribed this methodology in detail because I fmd it such an excel-
lent approach. It is difficult to imagine important arms-control 
issues which do not fit readily into this framework. For example, 
last year a popular but unscholarly writer seriously visualized a 
situation in which the Shah of Iran would. collar the world 
through nuclear blackmail. In the framework of this study, it is 
clear that the United States-Soviet nuclear dominance will not 
be challenged in the 1980s, and for considerably longer, regardless 
of the proliferation of weapons, the possible limitations on the use 
of nuclear weapons, progress toward eliminating nuclear weap-
ons, and strategic deterioration. 
More important, the book's four hypothetical regimes allow 
the authors to demonstrate convincingly a conclusion which is, I 
believe, accepted almost unanimously by the knowledgeable: no 
simple nostrum will quickly enhance world security in the nuclear 
age. Proscribing the use of nuclear weapons against states with-
out them, abolishing nuclear weapons, or taking immediate steps 
to strengthen the United Nations or establish a world govern-
ment-all such measures are fraught with political and strategic 
uncertainties which might increase global instability and the 
danger of a nuclear holocaust. Strengthening one or more of our 
nuclear capabilities, such as our anti-ballistic-missile defense, 
similarly may increase instability. 
The authors weigh with both technical astuteness and lucid-
ity the pros and cons of these and many other suggestions, quali-
fiedly approving a very few. In short, they brilliantly avoid one 
of the two pitfalls of evaluating steps to avoid cataclysmic war: 
they do not issue "vague prescriptions for dramatic change that 
leave unattended the specific policy issues most likely, in fact, to 
form the next decade's nuclear agenda." I believe, however, that 
the authors less successfully avoid their first pitfall: the 
"preoccupation with the particulars of force posture and arms 
control issues at the expense of conceiving more basic alternatives 
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to present conditions." I shall try to illustrate this weakness by 
taking a somewhat whimsical detour-for me a sentimental jour-
ney-to contrast the apparently simplistic approach to arms con-
trol of the early 1950s with the approach of today. 
In the early 1950s, no more than a half dozen of us planned, 
as well as conducted, the bulk of international negotiations. How 
we would have welcomed studies such as the present volume! We 
had, nonetheless, some advantages. The first was Ben Cohen. I 
have never found his equal in devotion to the ideal of a safe world 
or in breadth of vision of how to get there. Our second advantage 
was a much readier access to the Secretary of State or even Presi-
dent Truman to resolve differences of view. Third, since most 
planners also participated in negotiations, we fully appreciated 
the vast attenuation of thought necessary to convert a sound idea 
into a product we could sell to international forums and the 
American public. This last fact made our ideas appear more sim-
plistic than they actually were. I believe that some of them re-
main basically important to the quest for a safer world, but they 
receive scant attention in this volume. 
For example, before 1951, many within the United States 
government insisted that disarmament negotiations cease until 
certain international political settlements were achieved, since 
the Soviet Union was exploiting the negotiations solely for propa-
ganda outbursts-"ban the bomb," "reduce conventional weap-
ons by one third," and so forth. In 1951, President Truman 
announced the far-reaching decision that political settlements 
and disarmament negotiations should proceed concurrently, so 
that progress in either area could facilitate progress in the other. 
Ostensibly little more than a procedural decision, this announce-
ment actually reflected the triumph of the much-debated view 
that more was to be gained in assuring world peace by de'tente 
than by an arms race and confrontation. This decision was the 
lineal ancestor of others; it harbingered such projects as increased 
cultural exchanges and attempts to promote East-West trade, as 
well as strides toward political settlements. More bread in the 
Soviet Union might mean fewer guns, which might lead to a more 
open society and a greater distaste for the threat of wars. This 
concept of concurrent political and disarmament negotiation con-
tinues to be the United States policy, I believe, toward the coinci-
dent Middle East and SALT negotiations. Yet I find virtually no 
analysis in this volume of the role of such political and economic 
initiatives in avoiding cataclysm. 
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The authors' failure to consider the significance of political 
and economic initiatives is most pronounced in their elaboration 
of the "Fourth Nuclear Regime," where the strategic deteriora-
tion of either the United States or the Soviet Union could induce 
a "nuclear asymmetry" in which the stronger super-power might 
more willingly chance a preemptive nuclear strike. Dr. Gompert 
does give lip service to the importance of politics and economics 
in averting destabilization: 
If the politics of detente have not averted a destabilizing strategic 
arms trend-and it appears they have not-what sort of politics 
could? However, the real danger is not that politics will fail to 
contain technology but that politics, too, will go sour in large mea-
sure as a result of developments in technology-sour enough to 
exacerbate technology competition and too sour to permit ade-
quate management through negotiation and tacit understanding. 
[P. 256] 
He emphasizes that the crucial point in strategic deterioration 
would be passed when the United States loses its credibility as 
the protector of its allies, a point which would precede by years 
the Soviet Union's ability to launch a preemptive first nuclear 
strike without risking its own destruction. This is an excellent 
start toward a thorough political and economic analysis, but 
when Dr. Gompert discusses specific developments that might 
destroy the United States credibility, he ignores those which are 
not predominantly technological. He does not consider possible 
economic developments such as the dwindling dollar, nor domes-
tic political developments such as the tax revolt, which might 
fetter necessary expenditures for new technology. We should not 
forget that just that type of frenzied domestic political reaction 
played a great role in deciding Vietnam. 
One other example: In suggesting that the Soviet economy 
might not be capable of sustaining a vastly increased military 
program, the authors fail to consider the age-old method by which 
despots extend their military strength beyond their resources-
plunder. The economic system of the Soviet bloc already 
features a subtle exploitation of satellites' resources. That could 
increase dramatically if Soviet military leaders felt themselves 
threatened. I do not, however, anticipate that Brezhnev's suc-
cessor will be a Genghis Khan. 
Nevertheless, these shortcomings, as I see them, are rela-
tively minor compared to the book's brilliant analysis of the cur-
rent world situation, which the scientist Dr. Robert Oppenheimer 
"likened to two scorpions in a bottle each capable of killing the 
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other but only at the risk of his own life." Notwithstanding the 
authors' care to hedge any approval of specific proposals, their 
failure to evaluate the significance of politics and economics 
strengthens the hawks' case and weakens the doves'. By this time, 
it should be obvious that I am a confirmed dove. 
